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Abstract
Using a team-production model with heterogeneous workers, we examine the short- and
long-run eciency eects of skill diversity and leadership in teams. Our analysis focuses on
workers' strategic incentives to manipulate their skills. In the short run, heterogeneous pair-
ing (pairing workers with dierent skills) yields a greater total production than homogeneous
pairing. However, in the long run, homogeneous paring may yield a greater total production
because of gradual improvements in workers' skill. We also show new potential benets of
leadership: assigning a leader to a team yields a smaller total production in the short run,
but, a greater production in the long run by preventing workers from consistently reducing
their skills.
JEL Classication: H41; D21; M54
Keywords: Team production; Voluntary provision of public goods; Leadership; Ecient
role assignment; Team-building
1 Introduction
How to best organize workers in teams and assign leadership roles are important issues not only
for managers in charge of team production, but also for the rm overall. One important objective
of managers is to provide workers with the right incentives to dedicate considerable eort to team
production. As is well known, workers may by tempted to free ride on other workers' eorts
when rewards are based on team performance rather than individual performance. The other
important objective of managers is to encourage workers to improve their skills and productivity.
The company can enjoy long-term benets in team production if managers successfully provide
workers the right incentives to voluntarily improve their skills by establishing an appropriate
team structure.
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and suggestions.
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However, dierent methods of forming teams and assigning leadership roles may have dierent
impacts on workers' incentives to free ride and upgrade their skills. This raises some practical
questions about the desirable organizational structure of teamwork. Is a team composed of
workers with similar level of productivity more encouraged to improve their productivity than
a team composed of workers with varying productivity levels? How does the assignment of
leadership roles aect team production on the short term and skill development on the long term?
How do managers' contract terms aect their decisions regarding organizational structures?
To address the issues, this paper examines the optimal design of teams by employing a team-
production model within a rm. We develop the simplest possible model in which a manager
divides workers into teams of two, and team production is iterated many times between the
same pair of workers. Workers choose their contribution to team production, and their skills
in contributing change gradually over time. Therefore, the manager has short- and long-term
objectives: to increase the total team production taking the workers' skill levels as given, and
to provide workers with the right incentives to improve their skills. In other words, in the short
run, the manager establish teams to maximize total production taking the workers' skill levels
as given, and in the long run, he/she should consider the eect of changes in workers' skills on
team production.
Within the above framework, we investigate how managers should pair workers with dierent
productivities into teams and how they should assign leadership roles in order to achieve short-
and long-term objectives. In particular, we consider two ways to pair up workers and two role
assignments. One is homogeneous pairing{where the manager pairs up workers with the same
skills{and the other is heterogeneous pairing{where the manager pairs up workers with dierent
skills. The two types of role assignment are as follows: horizontal teamwork, where workers
in each team have no particular role, and vertical teamwork, where one worker is assigned a
leadership role. Theoretically, the dierence between horizontal and vertical teamwork is the
dierent timing of the moves between workers in each pair: horizontal teamwork is modeled by
the simultaneous-move (Nash) game of team production, whereas vertical teamwork is modeled
by the sequential-move (Stackelberg) game.
We show that strategic incentives for free riding or manipulating skills depend on the initial
skill gaps and workers' preference for rewards based on their team production. In a horizontal
teamwork game, we nd that both workers have no incentives to improve their skills (in fact,
they even have wrong incentives to lower their skills) if the initial skill gaps between them and
preferences for team rewards are small. Although a decrease in one worker's skills will diminish
the overall eciency in team production, it will also decrease the other worker's free-riding
incentives. Therefore, if the latter eect dominates the former, both workers have strategic
incentives to be less-skilled. On the other hand, both workers have the right incentives to
improve their skills if the skill gaps are small and the preference for team rewards is large. We
also nd that there is a tendency that a relatively high-skilled worker has incentives to further
increase his/her skills, but a relatively low-skilled worker has incentives to decrease his/her skills
(or has no incentives to improve his/her skills) if the initial skill gaps between them are large.
In other words, the initial skill gaps between workers in a pair may be widened, but cannot be
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reduced over time.
Comparing homogeneous and heterogeneous pairings in horizontal teamwork, we nd that,
in the short-term perspective, heterogeneous pairing yields equal or greater total production
than homogeneous pairing. However, when workers' preferences for team rewards are large,
homogeneous pairing can provide all workers with the right incentives to improve their skills,
while heterogeneous pairing may not. In that case, homogeneous pairing results in greater total
production than heterogeneous pairing in the long term. On the other hand, when workers'
preferences for team rewards are small, heterogeneous pairing yields greater total production
in both short and long terms. This is because, in this case, all homogeneously paired workers
persistently try to reduce their skills (or at least to not actively improve them) for strategic
reasons.
We then nd that in vertical teamwork game, it is impossible for all workers to have incen-
tives to reduce their skills in equilibrium. This is in contrast to the case of horizontal teamwork.
In particular, a leader never has incentives to reduce his/her skills, while a follower may have.
In addition, in the short term, a greater or equal total production can be achieved with het-
erogeneous pairing compared to homogeneous pairing by by assigning a relatively low-skilled
worker as a leader. As in the horizontal teamwork game, heterogeneous pairing is preferable
for a manager in both short- and long-term perspectives when workers' preferences for team
rewards are small.
Finally, comparing the equilibria between horizontal and vertical teamwork games, we nd
that horizontal teamwork yields greater production than vertical teamwork in both short and
long term when workers' preferences for team rewards are large. However, when their prefer-
ences are small, managers may face tradeos between short- and long-term eciency in team
production; in the short run, horizontal teamwork leads to greater production. However, this is
not necessarily the case in the long run because it may provide workers with the wrong incentives
to continuously decrease their skills. Under vertical teamwork, there is no case where no one
tries to improve their skills. Therefore, we can state that the benet of having a leader is to
prevent workers from persistently reducing their skills. In addition, the tradeos may distort
the manager's decision in organizing teams, depending on the duration of his/her employment
contract. In particular, if a manager's contract duration is relatively short term, he/she may em-
ploy horizontal teamwork to obtain greater short-term team performances, which may decrease
long-term performances.
In the literature on the theory of the private provision of public goods, there is a well-known
paradoxical result on skills in contributing public goods: players may have strategic incentives to
reduce their own skills or to adopt inferior technologies in contributing public goods (Buchholz
and Konrad 1994; Ihori 1996; Buchholz et al. 1998; Hattori 2005). The disadvantage of being
more skilled is due to the fact that an increase in the contribution skills of one agent induces the
other agents to contribute less. These strategic incentives also play a signicant role in our study.
However, our study diers from the previous studies in the following three important aspects.
First, we consider a situation where agents (workers) have heterogeneous skills. This enables
us to answer the question of what type of worker, high-skilled or low-skilled, has incentives
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to improve (or reduce) their skills. Second, we consider the vertical structure (i.e., sequential-
move situation) as well as the horizontal structure (i.e., standard simultaneous-move situation)
within a team. Through a comparison of these structures, we provide a new interpretation of
the benets of leadership. Finally, we consider the problem of how managers should organize
heterogeneous workers into teams in order to increase the total production of the team (i.e.,
total provision of public goods).
Several theoretical studies have compared the outcome of simultaneous and sequential con-
tribution games. In the standard model of private provision of a public good, Varian (1994)
shows that a sequential-move contribution mechanism yields a smaller or equal amount of public
goods than a simultaneous-move mechanism. However, when other factors are introduced, the
resulting advantage of simultaneous-move over sequential-move mechanism with respect to total
amount of public goods may not be robust. Romano and Yildirim (2001) show the advantage
of a sequential-move mechanism in cases where players are motivated by \warm glow" or \snob
appeal." Vesterlund (2003) and Andreoni (2006) also show the advantages of a sequential-
move mechanism when there is asymmetric information on the value of the public good. Our
study considers the strategic incentives of players to improve (or reduce) skills and shows that
a simultaneous-move mechanism{versus a sequential-move mechanism{has an advantage in the
short run, but may not work in the long run.
This paper is also related to the literature on endogenous timing in a public good or a team
production game. Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010) develop an endogenous timing model where
two countries provide public goods, and show that the complementarity or substitutability of
public goods is crucial for the endogenous emergence of leadership. In their study, if the public
goods are substitutes (complements), then both players' contributions are strategic substitutes
(complements), and thus simultaneous-move (sequential-move) equilibrium occurs. In our study,
a leadership role is assigned to workers by a manager who does not directly engage in team pro-
duction or providing public goods. Because a vertical teamwork (sequential-move) situation
yields less team production (total provision of public goods) in the case where players' con-
tributions are strategic substitutes, there seems to be no reason for the manager to assign a
leadership role to some workers. However, as our results suggest, leadership assignment may re-
sult in a better outcome for the manager when we take into account workers' strategic incentives
to manipulate their skills.
In order to focus on workers' strategic incentives to improve or reduce their skills and the
resulting managerial implication in eective team building, we do not consider the issue of
asymmetric information on the value of team output or uncertainty in the productivity of the
team as in Hermalin (1998), Vesterlund (2003) and Huck and Rey-Biel (2006).1 Instead, we
consider the benets of leadership in a situation where workers with asymmetric skills can
gradually change their skill levels.
1Hermalin (1998) shows that if some workers are better informed of the value of team production than other
workers, by acting as an example by exerting high eort, a well-informed leader can induce the team members
to also exert high eort. For a comprehensive survey of the economic analyses of leadership, see also Hermalin
(2013)
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This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the basic structure of the model. Section
3 derives the equilibria of a horizontal teamwork game and analyzes workers' strategic incentives
to improve/reduce their skills. Then, we compare equilibria in two types of teams: homogeneous
or heterogeneous teams. Section 4 conducts the same analysis in the framework of a vertical
teamwork game. Section 5 discusses the benets of leadership by comparing horizontal and
vertical teamwork. Section 6 discusses three possible extensions of the model and the relationship
between the results and existing empirical and experimental studies. Section 7 concludes the
paper.
2 Basic Structure of the Model
Our team-production model is an extended version of the standard model of private provision
of public goods, such as the one proposed by Bergstrom et al. (1986). Consider a division in
a rm that consists of a manager and 2M number of workers. The workers are paired into M
teams of two and engage together in team production iteratively many rounds.2 In each round
of team production, each worker i (i 2 f1; 2g) in team k (k 2 f1;    ;Mg) obtains utility from
leisure time (xki) and rewards (Gk). The rewards, Gk, are assumed to be paid on the basis of
team performance in each round (i.e., the rewards are public goods for members in a team).
The team performance in team k is given by
Gk = kigki + kjgkj j 6= i;
where gki represents the eort contributed to team production expended by worker i in team
k (which is measured in units of time), and ki > 0 represents worker ki's productivity or
contribution skill per unit of time. As described in detail later, workers have the opportunity
to marginally improve or reduce their own contribution skills ki in the intervals between each
round of team production. The manager cannot observe an individual's eort, gki, but only the
amount the team produces, Gk. Therefore, the rewards paid to each worker i in team k (Gk)
are decided on the basis of team performance, and for simplicity, are assumed to be equal to Gk.
Each worker ki has a following Cobb-Douglas utility function:
Uki(xki; Gk) = (1  ) lnxki +  lnGk;
where  2 (0; 1) represents the preference for rewards compared to leisure time. In each round
of team production, each worker has a unit of time endowment to be allocated between his/her
eort to the team production, gki, and leisure, xki  1  gki.
The manager decides how to pair workers and whether to assign a leadership role to one
of the two workers in each team, in order to increase the total production. In the short term,
the eect of changes in workers' skills are negligible, so the manager's objective is to simply
2We assume a situation where the production of outputs or services requires pairs of workers as a xed input, for
example, double-handed sailing (sailing with two persons on board), assembling components in a factory, security
guards, and a driver and a navigator in eldworks. Each worker's contributions are assumed to be variable inputs
for team production.
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Manager chooses the 
type of team-building
Gradual changes in contribution-skill level
Workers simultaneously choose their contribution 
to team production.
Worker L chooses 
his/her contribution.
Worker F chooses 
his/her contribution.
Gradual changes in contribution-skill level
Horizontal teamwork
Vertical teamwork
Figure 1: Structure of the game
maximize the total production of all teams in each time of production, F PMk=1Gk, given the
workers' initial skills. However, in the long term, the manager has to care about the gradual
changes in workers' skills because the changes aect the total production over time. Therefore,
the manager's long-term objective is to increase total production over time by providing workers
with the right incentives to improve their skills. We consider two ways for pairing the workers:
workers with same skills can be paired-up or workers with dierent skills can be paired-up. We
call the former homogeneous paring and the latter heterogeneous paring. In addition, we consider
two types of role assignment: horizontal and vertical teamwork. In horizontal teamwork, workers
have no particular role in a team, so they simultaneously decide how much eort to contribute
to team production.3 In vertical teamwork, the manager assigns one of the two workers in each
pair as a leader. Note that the leadership role here means solely moving rst. Therefore, the
situation of vertical teamwork is modeled by sequential contribution games.
Workers are assumed to have an opportunity to marginally increase or decrease their own
skills between the production stages. We assume that workers' incentives to manipulate their
skills are simply given by the sign of the marginal payos of the increase in skill.4 If a worker's
marginal payos of improving skills is positive (negative), he/she has incentives to marginally
improve (reduce) their skills and his/her skills are marginally increased (decreased) in the inter-
vals between the production stages.
Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the game: First, anticipating the equilibrium behavior
of workers in the subsequent stages, the manager decides how to pair up the workers (i.e.,
homogeneous or heterogeneous pairing) and whether to assign a leadership role to one of the
two workers in each team (i.e., horizontal or vertical teamwork), in order to increase the sum of
team production. Then, each worker non-cooperatively decides how much eort to contribute
to team production. This contribution stage is iterated many rounds.5 In the intervals between
3Note that in our model setting, there are no interactions between teams.
4In other words, we do not explicitly set up the stage where workers choose their skills and do not derive the
Nash equilibrium of this stage. For simplicity, this paper does not consider endogenous determination of skills
such as, for example, ex-ante investment or learning activities. However, if we take the ex-ante determination of
skills into our model, our results do not change qualitatively. In addition, our assumption of a gradual change
in skills comes from the fact that workers can change their amount of eort much easily than their contribution
skills
5In this paper, we exclude the possibility of cooperation in innitely repeated games by some history-dependent
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the contribution stages, workers' skill levels change gradually depending on their incentives.
3 Horizontal (Nash) Teamwork
3.1 Equilibrium in the contribution stage
In the horizontal teamwork game, each worker ki simultaneously chooses his/her contribution,
gki, to maximize his/her utility Uki, taking the other worker's choice of gkj (j 6= i) as given
(i.e., we are considering a Nash equilibrium). Solving the utility maximization, we obtain the
reaction functions as follows:
gki = R(gkj) = max

  (1  )kjgkj
ki
; 0

j 6= i: (1)
Because R0(gkj)  0, the individual contributions to team production are strategic substitutes.
Solving the above reaction functions, we derive the equilibrium contribution pair (gNki ; g
N
kj) as
(gNki ; g
N
kj) =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
(0; ) if
ki
kj
 (1  ) 
ki   (1  )kj
(2  )ki ;
kj   (1  )ki
(2  )kj
!
if (1  ) < ki
kj
<
1
1  
(; 0) if
ki
kj
 1
1  :
The above equations mean that if worker i has much lower skills than worker j (the case
for ki=kj  (1   )), worker i would be a free rider, and if worker i has much higher skills
than worker j (the case for ki=kj  1=(1   )), worker i would be the sole contributor.
Hereafter we call these corner-solution equilibria full specialization. Otherwise (the case for
(1   ) < ki=kj < 1=(1   )), both workers contribute a positive amount of time in an
equilibrium. We call these interior-solution equilibria collaboration.
The equilibrium team performance GNk is given by
GNk =
8><>:
kj if worker i is a free rider,
2k
2   if both workers collaborate,
where k  (k1+k2)=2 is the average productivity in team k. Then, we obtain the equilibrium
utilities as UNki  Uki(xNki; GNk ), where xNki = 1  gNki .
strategies (e.g., trigger or tit-for-tat strategies).
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3.2 Strategic incentives to improve/reduce skills
We derive the following comparative static results:
dUNki
dki
=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 if worker i is a free rider,
2k   kj
2ki k
if both workers collaborate,

ki
if worker i is a sole-contributor.
When dUNki =dki > 0, i.e., worker i's marginal utility of increasing his/her skills is positive,
worker i has incentives to improve his/her skills. On the other hand, when dUNki =dki < 0,
worker i has incentives to reduce his/her skills for strategic reasons. Obviously, a worker has no
incentives to change his/her skill levels if he is a free rider, but has if he/she is a sole contributor.
When both workers collaborate, it holds that
dUNki
dki
R 0 , ki
kj
R 1  

:
Then, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1
In horizontal teamwork,
(i) in a full specialization equilibrium, a free rider has no incentives to change his/her skill
levels, but a sole contributor always has incentives to improve his/her skills,
(ii) in a collaboration equilibrium, there are three possible cases: (a) both workers have incen-
tives to reduce their skills if the skill gap between them and the preferences for rewards are
small; (b) both workers have incentives to improve their skills if the skill gap is small and
the preference for rewards is large; and (c) a relatively high-skilled worker has incentives
to improve his/her skills, whereas a relatively low-skilled worker has incentives to reduce
his/her skills if the skill gap is large.
This proposition is closely related to the result obtained by Ihori (1996). Within the standard
framework of private provision of public goods, Ihori (1996) shows that each player may have
strategic incentives to reduce his/her contribution skills. Our Proposition 1 claries that such
results crucially depend on the preferences for public good (team rewards) and/or the skill gaps
between players. Although a decrease in one worker's skills will diminish the overall eciency in
team production, the worker is better o by decreasing his/her skills because it induces the other
worker to contribute more. Therefore, if the latter eect dominates the former, both workers
have strategic incentives to be less skilled.6
6Note that the strategic incentives of workers to decrease their skills result from the assumption that the
rewards are public goods for team members. Suppose instead that the rewards are based on relative performances
or contributions of team members (i.e., rewards are private goods). In this case, workers may have more incentives
to increase their skills when the skill gaps between them decrease because of competition within the team.
Proposition 1 indicates that workers may have more incentives to reduce their skills as the skill gaps decrease
when the rewards are based on team performance.
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Figure 2: Marginal utility of changing productivity in horizontal teamwork case
Proposition 1 also suggests that there is a tendency that a relatively high-skilled worker
has incentives to improve his/her skills, while a relatively low-skilled worker does not, but the
reverse is not the case. The intuition of this is simple: a marginal increase in the skills of one
worker increases his contributions, but{at the same time{it induces the other worker to decrease
her contributions. When the skill level of the former worker is higher (lower) than that of the
latter worker, this negative reaction has a small (large) impact on the former worker. Therefore,
the relatively high-skilled worker has incentives to heighten his/her contribution skills, but the
relatively low-skilled one does not.
Figure 2 depicts workers' incentives to change their skill levels. In the gure, (; ) represents
the sign of both workers' marginal utility of changing skill levels (the rst and second elements
are the sign of dUNk1=dk1 and of dU
N
k2=dk2, respectively). Worker 1 is a sole contributor and
worker 2 is a free rider in the region (+; 0), and the opposite occurs in the region (0;+). In these
regions, a sole contributor will have incentives to improve his/her skills, but a free rider will not.
In the region ( ; ), both workers have incentives to reduce their skills. In the region (+;+),
both workers have incentives to improve their skills. Note that when the skill gaps between
workers are large, represented by regions (+; ) and ( ;+), the relatively high-skilled worker
has incentives to improve his/her skills, but the low-skilled worker has incentives to reduce
his/her skills. The gure also indicates that if workers are symmetric in their skills (represented
by the dotted line), then all of them have incentives to reduce their skills when  < 0:5 and to
improve their skills when  > 0:5.
Corollary 1
In horizontal teamwork, the equilibrium of the contribution stage eventually converges to full
specialization if the initial skill gaps within teams are large. Both workers persistently reduce
their contribution skills when  < 0:5 and improve them when  > 0:5 if the initial skills are
9
symmetric between workers.
Workers have an opportunity to marginally change their skill levels in the intervals between
the contribution stages. In Figure 2, each arrow represents the direction of change in skills of
two workers in a pair. The gure indicates that in the specialization case (that is, regions (+; 0)
and (0;+)), skill gaps between the two gradually widen over time. In the collaboration case{if
the initial skill gaps are relatively large{the skill gaps widen over time, which eventually leads to
full-specialization. However, if two workers are symmetric, then their skills persistently increase
(decrease) over time when  is greater (smaller) than 0:5. These properties are crucial for the
manager's problem of eective team building.
3.3 Manager's problem: homogeneous vs. heterogeneous paring
Here we consider the manager's problem of pairing workers. As previously mentioned, the
manager's objectives are twofold: to increase the sum of team production and to encourage
workers to improve their skills. Assume that there are two types of workers: one half (M)
are high-skilled workers, who have a skill parameter h, and the other half (M) are low-skilled
workers, who have l (h > l). This assumption of half-and-half distribution of high- and
low-skilled workers is made for simplicity only, and{as shown later{all of our results also hold
for any distribution of high- and low-skilled workers. There are two ways of pairing workers:
homogeneous pairing, where workers of the same type are paired into a team, and heterogeneous
pairing, where workers of dierent types are paired.
When a manager employs homogeneous pairing, there are M=2 high-skilled pairs (consisting
of high-skilled workers) and M=2 low-skilled pairs (consisting of low-skilled workers). In this
case, there is no possibility that a full-specialization equilibrium occurs in every team. Then,
the team production of each high-skilled and low-skilled team is, respectively, given by
GNhh =
2h
2  ; G
N
ll =
2l
2  ;
where the subscript hh (ll) refers to the variables of high-skilled (low-skilled) pairs. Therefore,
the sum of the teams' production, FNhomo, is given by
FNhomo =
M
2
GNhh +
M
2
GNll =
(h + l)M
2   :
When the manager employs heterogeneous pairing, there are M symmetric teams (that con-
sist of high- and low-skilled workers). In this case, either a collaboration or full-specialization
equilibrium may occur depending on the skill gaps between h and l. Because the relatively
low-skilled worker will become a free rider in the specialization case, we obtain each team's
performances as
GNhl =
8<: (h + l)2   if both workers collaborate,
h if low-skilled worker is a free rider,
and the sum of teams' production under heterogeneous pairing is FNhetero =M GNhl. Therefore,
we nd that FNhomo = F
N
hetero if both workers collaborate in heterogeneous pairing, and F
N
homo <
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FNhetero if full specialization occurs in heterogeneous pairing. In other words, from a short-term
standpoint (i.e., given that the workers' skills are constant), the company's performance is equal
or greater when heterogenous pairing rather than homogeneous pairing is employed. However,
from a long-term standpoint (i.e., considering gradual changes in workers' skills), homogeneous
pairing may provide the right incentives to improve their skills and thereby yield a greater total
production.7
Combining the above with Proposition 1, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2
In horizontal teamwork, the sum of team production under heterogeneous pairing is equal or
greater than homogeneous pairing in the short run. However, heterogeneous pairing may not
provide workers the right incentives to improve their skills when the preferences for team rewards
are large ( > 0:5). In this case, homogeneous pairing may yield greater performance in the
long run. On the other hand, when the preferences for team rewards are small (  0:5),
homogeneous pairing provides workers with the wrong incentives to decrease their skills. In that
case, heterogeneous pairing yields greater performance in both short and long run.
The proposition is easily understood from Figure 2, which indicates that homogeneous pairing
results in persistent decreases (increases) in skills for both high- and low-skilled pairs if  < 0:5
( > 0:5). On the other hand, heterogeneous pairing results in full specialization when the
skill gaps are large. In that case, heterogeneous pairing only encourages the sole contributor
in a team to improve his/her skills. Therefore, homogeneous pairing can encourage workers to
improve their skills more (less) than the heterogeneous team if the workers' preferences for team
rewards are large (small). Therefore, from a long-term standpoint, the company's performance
in the case of homogeneous pairing may be greater than that in the case of heterogeneous pairing
when  is large.
4 Vertical (Stackelberg) teamwork
This section considers vertical teamwork, where the manager assigns one worker in each pair as
a leader (i.e., one worker acts as a Stackelberg leader and the other acts as a follower in each
pair). As shown in Figure 1, in a contribution stage, the leader of each pair chooses his/her
eort to put into team production rst, and then the follower observes the decision of the leader
and chooses his/her eort.
7 All of our comparison results also hold for any distribution of high- and low-skilled workers (not only a fty-
fty distribution). Suppose we have 2a number of high-skilled and 2b number of low-skilled workers in a department
(a > b). Then, homogeneous pairing leads to a high-skilled pairs and b low-skilled pairs: thereby, the total team
production is FNhomo = aG
N
hh + bG
N
ll . In contrast, heterogeneous pairing leads to 2b mixed (heterogeneous) pairs
and a   b number of high-skilled pairs: thereby, the total team production is FNhetero = (a   b)GNhh + 2bGNhl.
Comparing them yields FNhomo   FNhetero = bGNhh + bGNll   2bGNhl = 2[(GNhh + GNll )b=2   bGNhl]. Therefore, the
comparison reduces to (GNhh + G
N
ll )b=2   bGNhl, which is the same as the case of half-and-half distributions. The
same argument holds in the reverse case, i.e., a < b.
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4.1 Equilibrium in the contribution stage
In case of vertical teamwork, each worker in team k is indexed by ki (k 2 f1;    ;Mg and
i 2 fL;Fg), where L represents a leader and F a follower. By backward induction, we rst solve
worker kF 's problem, given worker kL's choices. Worker F's reaction function is the same as
(1), so worker L chooses gkL so as to maximize UkL, anticipating the follower's reaction. Solving
the problem, we derive the equilibrium contribution pair in team k as
 
gSkL; g
S
kF

=
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
(0; ) if
kL
kF
 1  
 
  (1  )kF
kL
; 1  + 2   (1  )kL
kF
!
if
1  

<
kL
kF
<
1  + 2
(1  )
(; 0) if
kL
kF
 1  + 
2
(1  ) :
We nd that, compared to the horizontal teamwork case, a leader is more likely to become a free
rider, which is consistent with the results shown in Varian (1994): a leader can enjoy a strategic
advantage by moving rst. Then, the equilibrium team production of team k can be obtained
as
GSk =
(
kj if worker i is a free rider,
2(kF + kL) if both workers collaborate,
which indicates that the team performances in case of full specialization are identical between
horizontal and vertical teamworks, but dier in the collaboration cases. We then obtain the
equilibrium utilities for worker ki as USki  Uki(xSki; GS), where xSki = 1  gSki.
4.2 Strategic incentives to improve/reduce skills
Then, we derive the following comparative static results:
dUSki
dki
=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 if worker i is a free rider,
2 k   kj
2ki 
if both workers collaborate,

ki
if worker i is a sole-contributor.
We have the following proposition.
Proposition 3
In vertical teamwork,
(i) in a full-specialization equilibrium, a free rider has no incentives to change his/her skill
levels, while a sole-contributor always has incentives to improve his/her skills,
(ii) in a collaboration equilibrium, (a) a leader always has incentives to improve his/her skills
and (b) a follower has incentives to improve his/her skills when F > L, and incentives
to reduce his/her skills when F < L and  is small.
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Figure 3: Marginal utility of changing productivity in vertical teamwork case
The proposition states that a follower may have incentives to reduce his/her skills, but a leader
never has such incentives in equilibrium. Especially in a collaboration equilibrium, worker L
always gains by an improvement in his/her skills. The intuition is simple: a worker is better o
by lowering his/her skills in a horizontal teamwork game because it will induce the other worker
to contribute more, but will diminish the overall eciency of team production. In contrast,
in a vertical teamwork game, a leader can determine a follower's response (contribution) by
committing his/her own contribution rst, without sacricing the overall production eciency.
Therefore, a leader has no incentives to reduce his/her contribution skills.
Figure 3 depicts the direction of a workers' change in skills in vertical teamwork. In the
gure, (; ) represents the sign of both workers' marginal utility of changing skill levels (the rst
and second element is the sign of dUNkL=dkL and of dU
N
kF =dkF , respectively). From Proposition
3 and the gure, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2
In vertical teamwork, the equilibrium of the contribution stage eventually converges to full-
specialization situations when  < 0:5 from any initial skill conguration between workers.
There is no case where both workers in a pair persistently reduce their skills.
In comparing Figure 3 with Figure 2, two points should be emphasized in the vertical team-
work game. First, the gure shows that there is no region in which both workers have incentives
to reduce their skills. Second, it is possible that the skill gap between workers shrinks when the
relatively low-skilled worker is appointed as a follower and becomes the sole contributor, which
is represented by the area above L=F = 1 of (0;+) region in the gure. In this case, only the
low-skilled follower has incentives to improve his/her skills, and thereby the skill gap shrinks
in an early phase and is reversed afterward. These points are quite in contrast to the results
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obtained in the horizontal teamwork case.
4.3 Manager's problem: homogeneous vs. heterogeneous paring
We consider a manager's problem of designing teams. As in the horizontal teamwork game,
we assume, for simplicity, that there are half (M) high-skilled workers, who have h, and half
(M) low-skilled workers, who have l (h > l). The manager decides whether to employ
homogeneous or heterogeneous pairing. In the heterogeneous pairing case, the manager also
assign one worker in each pair as a leader.
When the manager employs homogeneous pairing, full specialization occurs when   0:5
and a collaboration occurs when  > 0:5, as shown in Figure 3. The team production in the
pair of high-skilled workers GShh is given by
GShh =

h for   0:5,
22h for  > 0:5,
and the team production in the pair of low-skilled workers GSll is given by
GSll =

l for   0:5,
22l for  > 0:5.
Therefore, the sum of team production in case of homogeneous pairing, FShomo  (M=2)(GShh +
GSll), is given by
FShomo =
(
M for   0:5,
22 M for  > 0:5,
where   (h + l)=2 is the average skills in all workers.
When the manager employs heterogeneous pairing, either a collaboration or full-specialization
situation may occur depending on whether the high-skilled or low-skilled worker is assigned to
be a leader. First, we consider the   0:5 case. Figure 3 indicates that the manager may yield
the full-specialization situation by assigning the low-skilled worker as a leader. In this case, the
sum of team production is given by hM . On the other hand, if the manager assigns the high-
skilled worker as a leader, then either a collaboration or a full-specialization situation occurs,
and the sum of team production is given by 22 M (collaboration) or lM (full specialization).
Because hM > 22 M and hM > lM hold for   0:5, we nd that the manager prefers
full specialization, where a low-skilled worker is assigned as a leader, rather than a collaboration
or full-specialization situation, where a high-skilled worker is assigned as a leader.
Second, we consider the  > 0:5 case. Figure 3 indicates that when the skill gap between the
high- and low-skilled workers in a team is small, no matter which worker the manager assigns
as a leader, the collaboration situation occurs, yielding GShl = 2
2 . When the skill gaps are
large enough, the manager can obtain either the full-specialization situation and GShl = h by
assigning the low-skilled worker as a leader, or the collaboration situation and GShl = 2
2  by
assigning the high-skilled worker as a leader. Because the former is necessarily greater than the
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latter in this case, the manager prefers the full-specialization situation when the skill gaps are
large enough.
In summary, the sum of team production in the case of vertical and heterogeneous pairing is
FShetero =
8><>:
hM for   0:5,
22 M for  > 0:5 and skill gaps are small (collaboration),
hM for  > 0:5 and skill gaps are large (full specialization),
Therefore, we nd that FShomo < F
S
hetero when   0:5, FShomo < FShetero when  > 0:5 and skill
gaps are large, and FShomo = F
S
hetero when  > 0:5 and skill gaps are small.
8
Proposition 4
In vertical teamwork, the sum of team production under heterogeneous pairing in which a low-
skilled worker is assigned as a leader is equal or greater than homogeneous pairing. However,
heterogeneous pairing may not provide workers with the right incentives to improve their skills
when the preferences for rewards are large ( > 0:5). In this case, homogeneous pairing may
yield a greater performance in the long run. When the preferences for team rewards are small
(  0:5), both paring methods provide workers with the incentives to change their skill levels
in the same direction, and therefore, heterogeneous pairing yields a greater performance in both
short and long run.
Homogeneous pairing provides all workers with the right incentives to improve their skills
when the preference for team rewards is large. On the other hand, heterogeneous pairing provides
only one worker in each team the right incentives to improve his/her skills when there are large
skill gaps in the pairs. Therefore, in this case, homogeneous pairing has an advantage over
heterogeneous pairing from a long-term standpoint.
5 Why are Leaders Necessary?
This section compares horizontal teamwork with vertical teamwork and considers the benets
of leaders for both managers and the rm.
Comparing GN with GS , we nd that GN > GS holds under the parameter values where
workers collaborate in horizontal teamwork and GN = GS holds under the parameter values
where full specialization occurs in horizontal teamwork. This result is consistent with that
shown in Varian (1994, Corollary, p.179). This is because each worker's contributions to team
production are strategic substitutes, and the leader's contributions in the sequential game are
never larger than those made in the simultaneous contribution game. Therefore, in the short
run, the horizontal teamwork is preferable for the manager and generates a greater sum of team
production.
However, as shown in the previous sections, horizontal teamwork in the long run does not
necessarily yield a greater team performance if we consider workers' strategic incentives to
8As in footnote 7, the results in Proposition 4 remain unchanged for any distribution of high- and low-skilled
workers in a department.
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improve or decrease their skills. In particular, horizontal teamwork provides both workers the
incentives to persistently reduce their skills when their preference parameters for team rewards
are small (represented by ( ; ) region in Figure 2); in contrast, such a dismal situation never
happens in vertical teamwork. Therefore, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 5
When the preferences for rewards are large ( > 0:5), both in the short and long run, horizontal
teamwork yields a greater sum of team production than vertical teamwork. When the preferences
for rewards are small (  0:5), horizontal teamwork initially yields a greater team production,
but in the long run, vertical teamwork may provide a greater sum of team production through
gradual changes in workers' skill levels.
The proposition implies a trade-os between the short- and long-term performances in team
production: In the short run, horizontal teamwork leads to greater production than vertical
teamwork, but is not necessarily the case in the long run, because all workers may consistently
try to reduce their skills in horizontal teamwork. The result suggests a potential benet of
leadership in team production: Leadership can prevent workers from persistently decreasing
their skills. Furthermore, the tradeos may distort a manager's team assignment decisions,
depending on the duration of his/her employment contract. When the manager's contract terms
are relatively short term, he/she may employ horizontal pairing to have greater short-team gains,
disregarding the long-term eect of workers' strategic incentives to reduce their skills on team
performances.
6 Discussion
In this section, we briey discuss three possible extensions of the basic model. Then, we discuss
the contributions of our analysis, especially in the relationship between our theoretical results
and existing empirical and experimental works.
First, the future possibility of team reorganization and workers' rational expectations over
the possibility will aect the present incentives of workers to manipulate their skills. Consider a
situation where a manager divides workers into homogeneous pairs without a leader. Proposition
1 indicates that all workers will have incentives to reduce their skills when the preferences for
team rewards are small. However, if workers take the future regrouping of teams into account,
they may in fact have incentives to improve their skills, because although it may decrease their
present payos, it will raise future payos by increasing the chance of being paired with high-
skilled worker. In contrast, under a heterogeneous pairing system, rational workers may reduce
their skills (or may not improve their skills) in order to increase the chance of being paired with
high-skilled worker in the future. Therefore, in this sense, homogeneous pairing may provide
workers with more incentives to improve skills than heterogeneous pairing. A similar scenario
applies when comparing horizontal and vertical teamwork. As Proposition 4 indicates, in a
case where a manager employs vertical teamwork, he can attain maximum total production
by assigning a relatively low-skilled worker as a leader. If workers expect the present team to
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be regrouped in the future, they may strategically reduce their contribution skills to obtain
the position of a leader in the future and enjoy the rst-mover advantages. In other words,
leadership assignment for increasing short-term production may not be suitable for providing
workers with the right incentives to upgrade skills.
Second, our results on the benets of leadership also hold for the case where more than
two workers are required to engage in team production. In the case where workers are divided
into teams of more then two, each worker is more likely to have incentives to decrease his/her
contribution skills, as Ihori (1996) shows. This is because reducing skills has little impact on
overall production eciency in team production, but has a greater positive spillover eect from
increases in the rest of the teammates' contributions. In other words, in a horizontal teamwork
case, the result that all workers have incentives to reduce their skills is more likely to occur if
the number of workers in a team is large. In addition, in a vertical teamwork case in which one
worker is a leader and the rest are followers, the leader never has incentives to reduce his/her
skills because he/she can determine followers' responses (contributions) by committing his/her
contributions in advance. Therefore, the existence of a leader is more likely to prevent workers
from persistently lowering their skills if the number of team members is large.
Third, we focus on a fully noncooperative game, thereby excluding the possibility of some
forms of cooperation within pairs. Do workers have strategic incentives to reduce their contribu-
tion skills when workers cooperate in team production? Consider a situation where cooperation
(or a joint payo-maximizing outcome) between workers in each pair is sustained by, for exam-
ple, trigger strategies in a repeated game setting, as in Pecorino (1999). In this case, increasing
skills, which is given before the supergame of contribution game, may hinder cooperation by
increasing the other worker's incentives to deviate from the joint payo-maximizing outcome.
This is because an increase in one worker's skills necessarily increases the other worker's payo
in a one shot noncooperative game. Next, consider a cooperative situation of Nash bargain-
ing between two workers. Clearly, an increase in one worker's contribution skills enlarges the
joint-utility possibility frontier, which benets both workers. However, as shown in this paper,
workers are worse o by increasing their contribution skills under non-cooperative situations,
which means that it may decrease the payos in the disagreement (or threat) point of the Nash
bargaining problem. Therefore, we conjecture that workers may still have strategic incentives
to reduce their skills even if they cooperate with each other.
Our study relates to two strands of literature: (i) the comparison between sequential and
simultaneous-move in the voluntary provision of public goods, (ii) the eciency eect of leader-
ship and heterogeneous/homogeneous grouping in team production.
First, several papers on voluntary provision of public goods theoretically compare equilibria
with sequential and simultaneous moves, as we did in this paper. Varian (1994) shows that if
one agent can commit rst (a sequential-move game), the leader can free ride on the follower's
eort and that the total amount of public goods will be smaller than in the non-commitment
case (a simultaneous-move game). Gachter et al. (2010) experimentally conrm that the total
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contribution to public goods is lower under sequential than under simultaneous contributions.9
However, they nd that leaders do not attain their rst-mover advantage, which is not consistent
with the theoretical predicted. Their laboratory experiment does not consider the long-term
eect of changes in players' skills because the contributions by the subject (player) are monetary
and the contribution stages are iterated at most 15 rounds in their experiment. Although the
mechanism diers, our theoretical results also nd the second mover's incentives to reduce
his/her contribution skills in order to free ride on the rst mover's eort: the followers can
induce more eort from the leaders by committing to lower their productivity.10
Second, our comparison of homogeneous and heterogeneous pairing relates to the literature
on the eect of diversity on team performance. Focusing on the complementarity in workers'
skills, some studies investigate the eect of diversity in productivity on the performance of
team production.11 For example, examining detailed company data in a garment factory in
Napa, California, Hamilton et al. (2003, 2012) nd evidence that more heterogeneous teams
are more productive than the teams of the same ability, with the average ability held constant.
Our Proposition 2 also shows that if  is small, heterogeneous teams yield a greater outputs
than homogenous teams in both short- and long-run perspectives. Furthermore, Hamilton et
al. (2003, p.493) show that \higher-ability workers appear to improve team productivity more
than low-ability workers do" in the sense that \an increase in the productivity of the most
able team member has a signicantly larger impact on team productivity than an equivalent
improvement in the ability of the least able member." Our study{showing that there is a
tendency for the relatively high-skilled (low-skilled) worker to improve (reduce) his/her skill{
may be consistent with their nding. Hamilton et al. (2003) conclude that the reason why teams
with a greater spread in ability are more productive can be attributed to a complementarity
in production among workforces. In particular, they indicate that the worker complementarity
within teams comes from bargaining in team behavior, where high-ability workers can impose
a higher norm of team output, and from mutual learning, where more able workers teach their
9Andreoni et al. (2002) also show that the total contributions in the simultaneous game are greater than
those in the sequential game in the early round of the experiment, but the results are very similar by the end
of the experiment. In contrast, Rivas and Sutter (2011) experimentally show that when each group member can
volunteer to contribute before the other members (equivalently to be a leader), the total amount of contributions
is greater than when there is no leader at all, i.e., all members contribute simultaneously.
10In the presence of asymmetric information or uncertainty about the quality of public good, some theoretical
studies show the benet of leadership in the provision of public goods (Hermalin 1998; Verstrlund 2003; Huck
and Rey-Biel 2006). In such an environment of asymmetric information, a leader's action can convey relevant
information to followers, leading to an eciency gain in team production. For experimental studies, Potters et al.
(2005, 2007) experimentally conrm the benets of leadership (or those of sequential-move contribution) in such
an environment. Although our theoretical model is based on full information, there are some benets of having
leadership in teams: the existence of a leader can prevent workers from consistently reducing their skills.
11Lazear (1998, 1999) suggests three conditions in which a diverse team can yield productivity gains: (i) the
information or skill sets of workers must be disjoint, (ii) the information or skills must be relevant, and (iii) the
costs of communication among team members must be insignicant to perform the relevant joint tasks. These
requirements relate with complementarity in production among workers within a team. In contrast, the results
of our comparison of homogeneous and heterogeneous teams do not come from the complementarities, but from
workers' strategic motives to manipulate their skills.
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less-able colleagues to be more productive. Note that our results are consistent with their
empirical ndings{although we do not include worker complementarity in production, but focus
on workers' free-riding incentives and strategic manipulation of their skills.
7 Conclusion
Facilitating productive teamwork between employees is one of the keys to success in any busi-
ness environment. In this paper, using a simple model of team production with heterogeneous
workers, we examine the short- and long-run eciency eects of skill diversity and leadership
on team production.
The results obtained in this paper are summarized as follows. First, in horizontal teamwork,
where there is no leader assigned, the workers have the wrong (right) incentives to reduce
(improve) their skills if the skill gaps are small and the preferences for team rewards are small
(large). If the skill gaps are relatively large, there is a tendency for the relatively high-skilled
(low-skilled) worker to improve (reduce) his/her skill. In contrast, in vertical teamwork, where
one worker is assigned a leadership role, the leader never has incentives to reduce his/her skills.
Second, in both horizontal and vertical teamwork, heterogeneous pairing yields greater or
equal total production than homogeneous pairing in the short term. On the other hand, in the
long term, homogeneous pairing may yield a greater total production because of the gradual
improvement in workers' skills, depending on the initial skill gaps and workers' preference for
team rewards.
Finally, by comparing horizontal teamwork performance with vertical teamwork performance,
we nd that a manager may face tradeos between short- and long-term team productions
with regard to the assignment of a leader. In the short run, horizontal teamwork leads to a
greater production, but in the long run, this is not necessarily the case because it may provide
workers with the wrong incentives to persistently reduce their skills. Therefore, we oer a new
explanation for the benet of leadership in team production: the existence of a leader can
prevent workers from continuously reducing their skills. We suggest that if a manager's contract
duration is relatively short term, he/she may employ the horizontal teamwork to obtain greater
short-term team performances, thereby negatively aecting the company's prots on the long
term.
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